

"Ignorance is the parent of fear." — Herman Melville, *Moby Dick*

Infosec is consistently a tech laggard – "skepticism" is seen as a strength



- 1. A History of Cloud Compunction
- 2. APIs: Infosec's Anathema
- 3. The Curse of Containers
- 4. Cheat Codes for Dealing with This

A History of Cloud Compunction




"Storing data online," shared resources, insider threat, DDoS, supply chain...


The crux of cloud fear was rooted in a loss of control by the infosec team

The firewall was always the center of the enterprise infosec universe

Firewalls and Defense in Depth

□ Example security architecture






Defense in Depth model: the firewall is the first line of defense

Cloud + microservices represents a Copernican revolution for infosec

What do surveys from yesteryear reveal about infosec's fear of cloud tech?

2012: "What is holding back cloud?"



"Uneasiness about adequate firewalling" = the pre-Copernican mindset





2015: 71% view cloud data security as a big red flag & 38% feared loss of control

Endowment effect & sunk cost fallacy: "Our security is better than CSPs!"

Evidence is quite scant that CSPs are breached more frequently

Acceptance that CSPs have better security is only in the past few years

Reality: misconfigurations are the biggest concern for cloud security

Gartner: "Through 2020, 80% of cloud breaches will be due to misconfiguration ... not cloud provider vulnerabilities"

Using cloud-native security controls can reduce security expense by 30%



So, how is infosec reacting to emerging tech today?



Microservices fears: APIs + containers



Basically monolithic app risk x 10,000 = infosec's mental model of microservices



Real history: lateral movement was easy because everything else was #yolosec



2018: 51% aren't certain the infosec team knows all APIs within the organization

Public API fears - adds attack surface, closer to attackers, impossible to control A lie: "Formerly, local networks had only a few connections to the outside world, & securing those endpoints was sufficient."

Public API fears - provides a "roadmap" for underlying functionality of the app

Reality: "Security through obscurity" is a garbage cop-out

Security resilience: assume your added security controls will fail




Standardization begets security benefits

- but isn't a common concept in infosec




Few in infosec realize containers aren't just featherweight VMs

2019: 94% have concerns on container security – leading 42% to delay adoption





52% want incident detection & response. 49% want isolation of pwned containers. 40% want "Al security analytics" & 22% want "blockchain" to secure containers.



Straw man: each container needs its own monitoring, management, & securing



Because scanning for vulns in monolithic, custom-built Java apps is easy???

Rose-tinted glasses: monolithic apps = "You know exactly where the bad guys are going to try to get in"





Should we go back to apps talking over FTP, telnet, SSH, random UDP ports, etc.?

Past: get in via a running FTP service Containers: exploit the web server

Container fear: too easy for devs to use vulnerable versions of software

As opposed to what – versions of Windows Server 2008 with Metasploit backdoors ready to go?



Now that we've explored the tinfoil universe, how do we return to reality?



How can we evangelize real threat models & solutions in this new world?



"DevOps is like a black hole to security teams because they have no idea what DevOps is doing and have no way of ensuring security policy is enforced."



Acknowledge there are relevant concerns for using this tech – just not the ones they believe



- 1. Don't expose cloud storage publicly
- 2. Don't use unauthenticated APIs
- 3. Don't use "god mode" in containers

Infosec's job becomes validating adherence to established best practices

Analogize "new security" to pre-Copernican methods to facilitate comms



Amazon Inspector + AWS Trusted Advisor are great tools to start

Use IAM roles for least priv or segment prod + dev through different accounts












Basic API hygiene will suffice – auth, validation, & not trusting external data

Example: Don't expose API keys in the URL, only use HTTPS endpoints, etc.



Validate input & content types. Explicitly define intended types & reject all others.



Analogize this as a form of granular whitelisting only possible with APIs



Any CISO will already be familiar with the concept of "Least Privilege"

Containers = antidote to the "Equifax problem" (patching procrastination)

Container registries make security scanning easier & add sense of control

Live migration means security can patch without impacting end users

Analogy: Windows updates if Word & PPT docs were migrated to a healthy OS



Codifying secure configs - modern equivalent of security policy templates Documenting threat models, starting with scenarios most damaging to the org & working back to likely vectors

Focus on securing data stores – enticing to attackers & less standardized

Help infosec finds database visibility & monitoring tools (e.g. Vivid Cortex)

Cultivates an activity baseline for policy creation & aids in security investigation



FIM is easier given the improved inspectability of containers

(Observability isn't a common term in infosec, but visibility is)

Infosec ppl aren't all the same – different tactics will work to build understanding

Generally, infosec is more familiar with Windows than Unix, thinks in a networkcentric model, & doesn't have dev skills

Patience, analogies, & proof that not all control is lost are critical ingredients



Letting go of core, long-held beliefs is difficult for anyone



Redirect grasping at phantasms towards control of meaningful threat mitigation

Work together to codify standards so infosec can focus on securing "pets"

