Paint by Numbers: Resilience in Security

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Hi, I'm Kelly



"They always say time changes things, but you actually have to change them yourself."

— Andy Warhol

Why are we waiting for practical security metrics to magically happen?

An absolute measure of an abstract concept is specious

A contextual measure of a definable outcome is reasonable

If security is treated as a crusade, success is only by taking control

If security is treated as a product, success can be defined & measured





"Be a better person" vs. "read 30 mins per day & volunteer 1x per month"

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It's time to paint your vision – don't leave the canvas unfinished

1. Why measurement matters 2. Resilience in complex systems 3. Resilience metrics in DevOps 4. Measuring infosec resilience

Why is measurement important?

Generally we do a thing in order to achieve a certain result

Process: "a series of actions taken in order to achieve a particular end."

You cannot people or technology your way out of bad processes

Define your desired result & what counts as "success"

Vision: reduce the security team's workflow volatility

Success: "In 1 year, my team will spend only 10% - 15% of time on firefighting"

Success: "In 6 months, JIT-pre-GA security reviews will decrea<u>se >50%"</u>

Success metrics create the numbers by which you paint your vision

Metrics are quantifiable measures to track & assess status

Your process must reflect a relentless pursuit of continuous improvement

Resilience in Complex Systems

Complex systems: non-linear activity in the aggregate

Infosec is a complex system.

Defenders, attackers, users, governments, vendors, SPs, etc...

Evolutionary resilience: assumes complex systems co-evolve

Three central features of resilience:

Robustness, Adaptability, Transformability

Resilience is a journey, not a singular, final destination

Natural disaster resilience must assume failure of controls

What % of human development is in known at-risk disaster areas?

Static indicators like high coral cover reflect favorable past conditions.

Erosion of reef resilience is dynamic.

Ongoing stress like ocean warming makes coral less resilient in the face of cyclones or coral bleaching events How many ongoing stressors exist? <u>How freq</u>uent are acute stressors?

Financial systems: how to withstand a negative, external shock

In a financial network, at what point does one default lead to a cascade?

High connectivity & large fraction of contagious links = riskiest nodes
Interconnectivity helps financial systems... until it hurts.

Not all transactions are equal: some create potential insolvency cascades

Systemic Risk Tax (SRT): tax transactions based on systematic risk

Source: "Incentivizing Resilience in Financial Networks," Leduc & Thurner

Resilience Metrics in DevOps

"Maturity models are for chumps." – Dr. Nicole Forsgren @nicolefv

Mutually exclusive beliefs:

Infosec is ever-evolving, but your program has an "end state"

Accelerate: rigorous data analysis of which metrics correlate with success

Successful measures: global (orglevel) results & outcomes (vs. outputs)

Global: intra-org teams shouldn't be pitted against each other

Outcomes: what actually helps your org? Lots of things don't

Lead time, release frequency, MTTR

Lead time: time to design a feature + time to deliver a feature

Release frequency: proxy for "batch size" (ie amount produced at a time)

Mean Time to Recovery: how quickly can service be restored?

Failure is inevitable. Mean Time to Failure is unrealistic & inhibits change

No tradeoff between improving performance vs. stability or quality

High performers:

Deploy frequency: on-demand

Lead time: <1 hour

MTTR: <1 hour

Westrum model of culture: power-, rule-, or mission-oriented

Solid info flow & info is actively sought. Messengers aren't shot.

Responsibilities are shared.

Cross-team collaboration is rewarded.

Failures are treated as learning opportunities for improvement.

How many (or few) of these match your infosec culture?

Measuring InfoSec Programs

Your program's goal isn't maturity – it's org-level continuous resilience

Aim for resilience-led outcomes – not outputs of Security Dogma

Infosec resilience means a flexible system that can absorb an attack and reorganize around the threat.

Flexibility: can your program serve your org's needs in the way it needs?

Global results: zealots combatting the "unenlightened" is unhealthy

Prioritizing infosec vs. org-level can lead to inhibition of innovation

Measure impact both ways: improved security vs. tighter bottleneck

Positive: reduction in number of security fixes per release

Negative: increase in engineering time spent using security tools

High-performing dev orgs spend 50% less time remediating security issues

Source: Accelerate by Forsgren, et al., 2018

Mean Time for Security Reviews Mean Time for Threat Modelling

Absorbing an attack: reducing contagion, adapting efficiently

Where are your highly connected, highly contagious nodes?
Measure ongoing amplification ratio: pwn of node_1 leads to X total dmg

Track ongoing stressors like complexity & employee turnover

Impact of a new vuln or breach depends on erosion by ongoing stress

Mean Time to Remediation: how quickly do you resolve an incident?

Mean Time to Failure (incident) can prioritize unhealthy stagnation

Deploy frequency of config mgmt changes (firewall rules, patches, etc.) Reorganize around the threat: can you transform & innovate?

SRT for tech: incentivize resiliency by throttling cascade-creating nodes

As in both finance & DevOps: there's no single, optimal architecture

Measure levels of interconnectivity, centrality, & correlation of IT systems

Acute stress * interconnectivity = potential propagation of pwn (PPP)

How is your security team's time being used?

SIEM maintenance = 30 hrs/month 12.5% of work time = \$1k+/month Time usage: problem solving, firefighting, meetings & maintenance



Suggested figures based on *Accelerate* by Forsgren, et al., 2018

How strong is your culture? Are you actually mission-oriented?

Equifax blamed one person for failing to deploy a patch.

Don't do that.

It is never just one person or variable in a complex system

If "the user" or "devs" don't security well, your infosec program is failing.

"When the tools provided actually make life easier for the engineers who use them, they will adopt them of their own free will."

- Accelerate, Forsgren, et al.

% of dev teams using appsec testing % 2FA usage across departments # of security support tickets filed

Net Promoter Score (NPS): Mathematical calc of satisfaction

Measure NPS among your colleagues & teams with whom you work "How likely are you to recommend our security program to a friend?"

If your org doesn't believe in you, you will be alone in the quest for resilience

Diversity: enhances adversarial analysis (true red teaming)

See "Red teaming probably isn't for you" by Toby Kohlenberg

Final note: there is short-term pain.

Progress follows a J Curve.

Conclusion

Measuring security is easier than you believe – when it isn't a crusade

Care about outcomes, not outputs – and embrace the continuous process

Measure resilience – flexibility, adaptability, transformability

Measure how security is helping your organization – not Security Dogma

Measure more than tech & tools – consider people & culture as well

DevOps is your new bff – work towards your common goals

"Have no fear of perfection – you'll never reach it."

- Salvador Dalí



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Suggested Reading

- <u>Accelerate</u> by Forsgren, et al., 2018
- <u>"Are We There Yet? Signposts On Your Journey to Awesome,"</u> Forsgren, 2017
- "Incentivizing Resilience in Financial Networks," Leduc & Thurner, 2016
- <u>"It's Not Just Semantics: Managing Outcomes Vs. Outputs,</u>" HBR, 2012
- "Operationalizing resilience for adaptive coral reef management under global environmental change," Anthony, et al., 2015
- <u>"Red Pill of Resilience,"</u> Shortridge, 2017
- <u>"Red teaming probably isn't for you,"</u> Kohlenberg, 2017
- "Resilience to Contagion in Financial Networks," Amini, et al., 2013
- "A strategy-based framework for assessing the flood resilience of cities: a Hamburg case study," Restemeyer, et al., 2015
- "Systemic Risk and Stability in Financial Networks," Acemoglu, et al., 2015